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Fr l ED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I-EB -2 1982

STANLEY MARTIN REDD;
SHEILA M. REDD, his wife;
STERLING HARDSON REDD;
JILL D. REDD, his wife;
PAUL DUTSON; and DONNA
DUTSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

.-.......-----------------------------------C!.er.[. Su!)l'em' c~urt, Utan

ADDITION OF NEW
AUTHORITY TO BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT
Case No. 17231

)
v.

)

WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN
COMPANY,

)

)
)
)

Defendant-Respondent.

)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

Defendant-respondent Western Savings and Loan Company
("Hestern Savings"), pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby submits additional authority in support
of its position in the above-entitled case.
In Lipps v. First American Service Corp., No. 800908
(Va., January 22, 1982), attached hereto as Exhibit "A", the
defendant-respondent lender began foreclosure proceedings
pursuant to a due-on-sale clause because the borrowers had transferred their property on a contract sale.

The lender offered

to let the purchaser of the land assume the loan upon the payment
of a two percent (2%) assumption fee and an increase in the
interest rate from 9-1/2% to 13-3/4%.

The purchaser refused

to assume the loan, thus the lender began foreclosure proceedings
when the outstanding balance on the loan was not paid.

The

borrowers and the purchaser sought an injunction against the
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foreclosure on the grounds that the due-on-sale clause was an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.

The trial court and the

Virginia Supreme Court rejected the borrowers' and purchaser's
contention.
In unanimously affirming the trial court's decision,
the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the following points
which directly support the arguments Western Savings presented
to the lower court, in its appellate brief and at oral argument
conducted over eight months ago, on May 12, 1981:
1.

The court specifically held that the due-on-sale

clause is not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, see id.
at 3-6 because it "does not defeat or forfeit the estate
conveyed [and it] does not affect the quantity or quality of
the conveyance between [the borrowers] and [the purchaser].
Its effect is confined to the acceleration of the due date of
the indebtedness.
2.

Id. at 4.

The court recognized that contracts are

looked upon favorably by the courts, and that "courts are
averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of
public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain."
Id. at 5, quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 125,
82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1954).
Pursuant to Rule 75(p)(3), the correcting pages
containing the above-described newly uncovered authority are
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filed herewith.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard W. Giauque
James R. Holbrook
Stephen T. Hard
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

~

./~~~·
.~/.

By

RlCardw:crrauqe
Attorneys for~
Defendant-Respondent
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PRESENT:

Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Compton, Tilomp~~n. and
Stephenson, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice

ALBERT B. LIPPS, ET AL.
Record No.

,800908

-v-

Record No. 800908

FIRST AMERICAN SERVICE
CORPORATION, ET AL.

OPINION BY JUSTICE W. CARRINGTON THOMPSON
January 22, 1982

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Percy Thornton, Jr., Judge
In this appeal we determine the validity of a "due-on sale"
acceleration clause in a deed of trust.

The trial court upheld

I

the validity of the clause, and we affirm that judgment.

On July 27, 1976, Albert B. Lipps and Judith W. Lipps (BorroW-

I

ers) executed a deed of trust conveying residential real estate
in Prince William County to secure First American Savings and

Loa~

I

Association (Lender) the payment of a promissory note for $31,500
with interest at the rate of nine and one-half percent per annum.

I
1

The deed of trust contained the following "due-on sale" acceleration provision (Covenant 17):
UNIFORM COVENANTS.
agree as follows:

Borrower and Lender covenant and

17. Transfer of the Prooert : Ass
tion. If all or
any part o t e Property or an nterest t erein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent . . . Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the
sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due
and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accel~
erate if, prior co the sale or transfer, Lender and the
person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred
reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on
the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such
rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the
option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and
if Borrower• s successor in interest has executed a written
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender
shall release Borrower from all obligations under this Deed
of Trust and the Note.

Pursuant to Code§ 6.1-330.34 1 , the deed of trust also contained this notice in the margin of the first page:
Code § 6.1-330.34.

"NOTICE:

Mortgage, etc., to contain not;_ce that;

debt is sub ·ect to cnll or modification or. conve ance of ;rooert .'
ere any oan is ma e secure
y a mortgage or ec OI trust on i
real property . . . and the note,_ or mortgage or deed of tr~st cvi~··
dencing such loan contains a provision that the holder of the not~
secured by such mortgage or deed of trust may accelerate payment I
of or renegotiate the terms of such loan upon sale or conveyPnce I

ofLawthe
security
property
or by
part
thereof,
then
the Services
mortgage
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or

DEBT SECURE:J HEREBY IS SUBJECT TO CALL IN FULL DR TIIE TERMS Tl!ERE-'
Record No.

800908

OF

BEL~G

I

MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CONVEYANCE OF THE ?RO-

PERTY CONVEYED."

I

I

On April 21, 1979, Borrowers entered into a "Land Contract

I

for Sale of Improved Real Property-Virginia" (Land Contract) with
Sandmar Associates, Inc. (Purchaser).

II

In the Land Contract, Pur-

chaser agreed to pay to Borrowers at closing a lump sum of $5,400,i
to take possession of the property and make all payments due undel
the note secured by the deed of trust, and to hold Borrowers harml
less from any liability under the deed of trust.

Borrowers agreej

to execute a general warranty deed to be held in escrow until pay

I

ment by Purchaser of the remaining balance of $30,986.97 due on
the note at the time of closing.
Borrowers and Purchaser closed under the Land Contract on
May 10, 1979, and settlement between the parties reflected the
charges made in a typical real estate closing.

On May 14, 1979,

Purchaser recorded the Land Cont:Tact in the Clerk's Office of the
Circuit Court of Prince William County.
Lender became aware of the Land Contract on October 22, 1979,
and after investigation, gave notice to Borrowers and Purchaser o

November 18, 1979, that it was exercising its option to declare
the balance on the deed of trust note immediately due and payable.
Lender offered to let Purchaser assume the loan, provided
that Purchaser (i) make application to assume the loan with satis
factory credit,

(ii)

pay two "points" (a two percent assumption

fee) on the outstanding note balance, and 'ciii) allow the interas
to be increased to thirteen and one-quarter percent.

Purchaser refused to make an application to assume the loan.
Neither Borrowers nor Purchaser paid the outstanding balance?. rluc
on the deed of trust note as a result of Lender's exercise of

Covenant 17.

On January 7, 1980, the Trustee under the deed of

deed of trust shall contain in the body or on th7 margin. thereof

I

a statement either in capital letters or underlined, wh1.cn will
advise the borrower as follows: 11 Notice--The Debt. secure~ ~ere~y 1

is subject to call in full or the terms thereof being

mod~f ied

the event of sale or conveyance of the property conveyed.
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in

trust gave notice of the proposed sale of the property.

Borrowers,

and Purchaser petitioned the lower court to enjoin the sale, but

it denied such injunctive relief.
Record No.
800908

On appeal, Borrowers contend that Covenant 17 is invalid as
an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

They assign error to

the action of the lower court upholding its validity, especially
where Lender did not prove impairment of security or risk of non-

payment, and to the holding of the trial court that the execution
and delivery of the Land Contract was a breach of Covenant 17.
I.

Restraint on Alienation.

Is Covenant 17 an unreasonable restraint on alienation?

hold that it is not.

In Hutchinson v.

~.

We

100 Va. 169, 175,

40 S.E. 655, 657 (1902), we restated the general rule:
It is well settled in this country and in England,
from which country we derive the principles of our jurisprudence, that a gift or grant of a beneficial estate, in

fee or absolutely, whether legal or equitable, has certain
legal incidents of which the estate cannot be divested,
and all conditions adopted for that purpose are necessarily
repugnant and void. Among those incidents are the donee's
or grantee's power of alienating such estate, and its lia-

bility for his debts.

[Citaeions omitted.]

The reasons for this doctrine or principle is the
repugnancy of such restraints upon the ordinary righes
of property, and that property would thereby be withdrawn
from the ordinary rules and channels of commerce and trade.
Since that time, we have had occasion to recognize statutory ex-

ceptions to the doctrine in Sheridan v.

~.

161 Va. 873, 172

S.E. 508 (1934) (upholding validity of spendthrift truses), and
to define

"reasonableness"

in this context in Hercules Powder

Company v. Continental Can Company, 196 Va. 935, 940, 86 S.E.2d
128. 131 (1955):
The reasonableness of a restraint on the use of
property "is to be determined by considering whether
it is such only as to afford a fair protection to the
interest of the party in favor of whom it is given,
and not so large as to interfere with the interest of

the public."
817 [1905].

~ v. ~. 104 Va. 1,28, 51 S.E.

The Supreme Court of Ncrth Carolina face<l thi~ identic-11
problem in~ v. First Federal Savings, et.:c., 289 N.C. 620,

625-26, 224 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1976), and said'
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One factor that significantlv affects tl1e nature of
this acceleration clause so far aS the restraints doctrine
is conce~ned is the fact that the creditor's right to accelerate arises only when the realty is alienated. Thus the
practical effect of tre due-on-sale clause when it ir'consider7d in is?lation is t~at the owner is encouraged not
to alienate his proper~y if it would be more advantageous
to enjoy a loan which has'""""become favorable because of
changed interest rates in the market. This is what may be
termed a hindrance or an indirect restraint on alienation.
As defined in L. SiQes and A. Smith, The Law of Future
Interests § 1112 (2d Ed. 1956), "An indirect restraint on
alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish
some purpose other than the restraint of alienability,
but with the incidental result that the instrument, if
valid, would restrain practical alienability. 11

Rec:ird No.
800908

The present state of the law is summarized in 3 L. Simes and
A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests§ 1164 (2d Ed. Supp. 1981),
where the author states:
Mortgages payable in installments often contain
provisions entitling the mortgagee to declare the entire balance due if the mortgagor's interest in the
mortgaged premises is transferred. Such acceleration
clauses have usually been enforced in accordance with
their tPrms but there is some authority that they are
invalid as restraints on alienation or, alternatively.
that a court of equity will deny enforcement in the
absence of a showing that the transfer jeopardized
the mortgagee's security.
For

amp~ication,

3d 713 (1976).

see cases

~here

cited.

s~e

also Annot.,

~9

'I
A.L.R.

For typical cases upholding the validity of the

I

clause, see Crockett v. First Federal Savings. etc., supra, and
Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Vence Partnershio, 206

Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).

For contrary cases, see~

v. Rochester Savings Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1981),
and Wellenkamo v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d
970 (1978).

For an elaborate treatment of the whole subject, in-

cluding its comment on the instant case while pending in the trial
court, see~ v. First Federal, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
Our analysis of the language used in Covenant 17 shows ~hat
enforcement of the covenant does not defeat or forfeit the estate
conveyed.

The transaction does not affect the quantity or quality~

of the conveyance between Borrowers and Purchaser.

Its effect is !

confined to the acceleration of the due date of the indebtedness.
Since public policy is at the heart of this controversy, we
repeat observations previously made.

In ~ v. Hughes, 196
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ii

I'

!

I

-Va. 117, 125, 82 S.E.2d 553, 553
~

The la•,.. . . . looks

wi

(l'.)'.>4:J, we stated:

~h favor

upon the mai<ir.g of contract::

bet~een co~p~~ent part7es up~r. valid consideration and for

law ul purposes.
?ubli--: pol.icy has it- place in the 1-...w of
contracts-:--yet th<?-t '.>1ill-o' -the-wisp of the law varies and
chan9es with the i.1terests, habits, need 1 sentiments and
fashi~ns of the da~, and courts are averse to holding contra7ts .unenfo~cea~ie en the ground of public policy unless
their illegality is clear and certain.

Code

§

55-59 details elaborate provisions governing deeds of

trust whether actually written therein or not:
Every deed of trust to secure debts . • • unless otherwise provided . . . shall be construed to impose and
confer upon the parties thereto, and the beneficiaries
~her7under, the following duties, rights, and obligations
in like manner as if the same were expressly provided for
by said deed of trust:
(l} The deed shall be construed as given to secure
the performance of ea~h of the covenants entered into by
granter, as well as the payment of the primary obligation.

ti:e

(6) In the event of default in the payment of the
debt secured, or any part thereof, at maturity, or in the
payment of interest when due, or of the br~ach of anv of
the covenants entered into or imposed upon the granter,
then at the request of any beneficiary the trustee shall
forthwith declare all the debts and obligations secured
by die deed of trust at once due and pQyable.
Thus, a general acceleration clause is read into every deed of
trust unless otherwise provided in the instrument.
Colgin, 163

Va. 848, 178 S.E. 15 (1935).

Devany v.

This acceleration

clause covers the breach of any covenant imposed by the instrument on the granter.

This obviously would include a covenant

not to convey the secured property without the consent of Lender.
A further clue to public policy questions is the chronology

of events in the enactment of Code§ 6.1-330.34.

Its antecedent,
2
6.l-2.4 to the Code.
As pointed

Acts 1974, c. 292, added Code §

out on brief, this last act began its legislative journey as

II

House Bill 001, 3 entirely different in purpose and effect from

Code § 6 .1-2. 4. Where any loan is made secured by a mortgage or deed of tr'..lst on real property comprised of one-to-fourfamily residential dwelling units and t..~e note, or mortgage or
deed of trust evidencing such loan contains a provi~don that the
I holder· c-f the note secured ! y such mortgagf or deed of tru!"" t may ,
accelerate payment of or renogo~ia.te the t-.c~s oj such loan upon I
sale or conveyance of the security property or part thereof, th?n
the mortgage or deed of trust shall contain in the b'?dy or on tne
margin thereof the following st.J.ten'ient either :i..n ?upi ta~ lett~rs .
1
or
"Notice--The debt secured her~by ~s sub]ect to
1
I callunderlined:
in full or the terms thereof being modifJ.c~ 1~~ the event of !
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the final enact:71cnt..

Acts 1.975, c. 418,

rccod~ficc.l Code

6.1-2.4 with slight vari~tion as it is in the p~esent Code
6.1-330. 34.

Thus, the General Assembly, instead of prohibiting '.

acceleration upon sale or transfer, expres~ly recognized its
existence and provided that it should be adequately publicized.
As indicated in Williams v. First Federal, 651 F.2d at 923-24, if
this be a restraint on alienation, it is one validated by

Virgini~

law as an inescapable conclusion from this statutory enactment.
Borrowers and Purchaser would have us read into the

'

I

accelera~

!

tion clause a proviso that in the event of a sale or transfer the

acceleration clause would not be operative unless the transfer or;I
sale would impair the security of the lender or otherwise
its risk.

increas~

I

In White v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. 749, 757, 164 S.E.

l

l

375, 377 (1932), we quoted Stonega Coal & coke co. v. Louisville
& N.R.R.Co., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E.551 (1906), stating our general

view in construing written contracts:
While the court, in construing a contract, may take
into view the circwnstances under which it was made, yet
when a breach of it is averred its language must determine
to what the parties to it bound themselves. courts are
not authorized to make contracts for t:1em or to add tc.
any stipulation which they have not seen proper to insert.
See

~

Sonny Arnold, Incorporated, et al. v. Sentry Savings

Association, et al., 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) •
Our conclusion is that covenant 17 is not an unreasonable
restraint on alienation and to the contrary has been sanctioned
as part of the public policy of the Commonwealth.
II.

Land Contract.

Borrowers and Purchaser argue that the Land Contract does not
trigger covenant 17.

.

I

They argue that it is a contract contingent.

i

upon the payoff of the deed of trust at which time a deed is to be
recorded; it is neither a transfer of title nor a sale under the
terms of the due-on sale clause.

We reject this contention.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

J

I

3 House Bill No. 601.
§ 6.1-2.3.
No financial institution,
subject to the provisions of this title, which makes. lo"n~ secured
by real property, shall reserve in the instrument evid::ncing such
loan or in the deed of trust on the real property serv1n~ as sccu~
rity for such loa.n the righ~ to call the loan or rcnego~~ate the 1
terms of the loan upon the sule of the real pr?pert~ ac~ing as
security so long as the original borrower remains liable for repayment of the loan.
- Institute
6 - of Museum and Library Services
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This inst:rument is denominated "Land Contract for Sale of
Improved Real Property-Virginia.
Record No.
800908

11

It provides that Purchaser

would make a lump-sum paymont of $5,400 a·: closing; Borro·.Jers
would execute a general warranty deed to Purchaser, the deed to
be held in escrow until the note :;~cured by the deed of trust had
been paid in full: Purchaser would have full possession of the
property after closing and would assume all risks or loss; Purchaser would asstune all responsibility for taxes and insurance on
the property and appoint the escrow agent as attorney-in-fact in

all matters concerning the property.

As a practical matter, Bor-

rowers, except for original liability, had relinquished all beneficial interest in the property.

Covenant 17 provides for the

activating of its provisions "if all or any part of the property
or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrowers."
Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 208, 120 S.E. 870, 873 (1924), is
controlling, and there we said:
When such a contract is concluded, although it is wholly
executory in form, it clothes the purchaser with an equitable estate in the land and the vendor ~ith an equitable
ownership of the purchase money. This because equity
treats that as done which ought to be done by the terms
of such a contract, and as the land ought to be conveyed
to the vendee and the purchase money transferred to the
vendor, equity regards these as done, and treats the
vendee as having acquired property in the land, and the
vendor as having acquired property in the price. It
follows that as the vendee has thus acquired the full
equitable estate, he may convey or encumber it, devise it;
if he dies intestate it descends to his heirs at law;
his wife is entitled to dower in it, and specific performance may be enforced against his heirs at law after
death. In fact, all the incidents of a real ownership
belong to it.
~.

Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 455, 164 S.E.2d 703,

706 (1968).
We therefore hold that Covenant 17 of the deed of trust was
breached by the execution of the Land Contract by Borrowers and
Purchaser on April 21, 1979.
Finally, we believe state law clearly establishes the validity of Covenant 17 .4 and we need not consider the complaint of
The deed of trust expressly provides in part:
15. Uniform Deed of Trust; Governing La~; Severabilit . This form at deed ot trust comoines u~ifor~ ~ovcnants
~ational use ancl non-unifqr".1 covenant~ .~..nth 11:ni.~ed ':1Ari
·
by jurisdiction co consti.tute a uni.term security .111ations
. u
l u-opPrty
This Deed of Trust shall b
:~~~~~~~ g~v~~~nfa~e~f tfie IuFi~dicti.on i.n which ~he Prop~r~~
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1

!,ccord No.

Borrowers and Purchaser that the trial court relied in part on

800908

federal law to sustain its judgment.

Affirmed.

I

,I

II·
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